Martin Luther King Lecture  
Stanford University  
April 5, 2008  

Copyright: Amartya Sen  

GLOBAL POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS  

Amartya Sen  

1  

Martin Luther King, Jr., has been described by Andrew Young as "the Voice of the Century." It is easy to see the reasoning behind this diagnosis, despite the fact that the twentieth century heard many other voices of remarkable vision and greatness - from Mohandas Gandhi to Nelson Mandela. Without placing Martin Luther King in a competitive race with other exceptional leaders of humanity, we can readily share Andrew Young's belief that "Martin Luther King, Jr.'s dream of American moral possibilities expressed a universal hope for mankind."1 For the subject of my talk on "Global Poverty and Human Rights," and indeed for this meeting on "global solidarity, human rights and the end of poverty," the hope for humanity has to be an essential ingredient.  

The huge aspiration - and the gigantic confidence - that King helped to generate about the possibility of ending poverty remains a call to action even today. And that call is as urgent today as it was more than forty years ago when Martin Luther King was alive and could inspire us through his oration, and not only through his writings, as he does today and will continue to do in the future. Severe poverty still characterizes a huge proportion of the people
of the world today. And the underdogs even in the USA—the richest country on earth—have not been able to shake off what Dr. King described, in his acceptance address at the ceremony for his Nobel Peace Prize, as "debilitating and grinding poverty [that] afflicts my people and chains them to the lowest rung of the economic ladder." King went on to outline his confidence that poverty can be ended: "I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits."\textsuperscript{11}

2

The world in which we live is both remarkably comfortable and thoroughly miserable. There is unprecedented prosperity in the world, which is incomparably richer than ever before. The massive command over resources, knowledge and technology that we now take for granted would be hard for our ancestors to imagine. But ours is also a world of striking deprivation and of astonishing inequality. A shocking number of children are ill-nourished, illiterate, and needlessly ill. Millions perish every week from diseases that can be completely eliminated, or at least prevented from killing people with abandon. Hope and confidence, along with clarity of thought on ways and means of bringing about necessary changes, remain important for our ability to confront what many see as an inescapable human condition, as if nothing better could be worked out, except perhaps in the unforeseeably distant future.
There is a terrible combination of fatalism and triumphalism in the contemporary world. It has been observed that today's optimists believe that we live in the best of all possible worlds, whereas today's pessimists fear that this is indeed true. Sharp diversities in assessing the consequences of "globalization" in the world seem to yield a similar unity of radical opposites. The urgent need for economic and political reform to reduce global inequity gets a cold shoulder from two quite different sides. Adoring admirers see globalization as a great contributor to the enrichment of the world and want to leave well alone (rather than trying to reform something that is "working so very well"), whereas those irreconcilably hostile to globalization identify it as the basic source of the main woes of the world, and see no point in trying to reform something that is foundationally "nonreformable and pernicious." Impervious complacency, thus, joins hands with the fatalism of gloom and doom.

Major institutional reforms are globally needed to work against the inequalities and unfairness of the current economic and political order, and the first point to note is that the world is thoroughly reformable. The defenders of globalization are not wrong in detecting vast scientific, technological, economic and social opportunities that globalization offers. These opportunities are indeed real and immense, but precisely for that reason, fairness requires that they be shared more equitably, without the monumental disparities that characterize the contemporary world. The so-called "anti-globalization" agitators may often fail to see the positive
role of global togetherness - economic as well as social - but insofar as they focus on the huge inequities that exist in the world, they do deserve careful hearing from the world leaders, rather than being roughed up by the Carabiniere.

Institutional reform is possible, and if well designed, can also be very effective. Indeed, a fuller understanding of economics may be useful both for the defenders and detractors of unreformed globalization. There is no such thing as "the" market solution, for the market is exactly as good as the company it keeps. It is extremely important to recognise that the market economy can yield very different results, depending on governing conditions, such as the distribution of resources and opportunities to develop skill and to secure fair bases of entry into market transactions, which in turn depend on the support of public distribution of education and health care, better functioning of trade agreements, reform of patent laws and environmental regulations, the operation of credit facilities, among many other influencing factors. All these influences are open to reform and change.

It is necessary to recognise that the opportunities that the poor have are restricted not only by antecedent poverty but also by (1) "global omissions," including that of strong globally shared efforts to combat the lack of educational facilities and health care in most countries, and (2) "global commissions," including unhelpful and one-sided institutional arrangements such as the existing patent laws, and the contribution of the world establishment in arms supply
and military conflicts which not only cause direct misery but also destroy the prospects of economic, social and political order.

To be sure, all these adversities call inter alia for local efforts at rectification in the poor countries themselves. The need for appropriate and energetic local action applies to rich countries as well as poor ones. For example, when some people are displaced from their old jobs (replaced by production with newer techniques, or by production of other commodities that replace older products, or through inescapable forces of global competition), something needs to be done to make sure that the displaced workers have access to alternative jobs. For this to happen at the necessary scale, long-run remedies have to be sought in, among other things, educational adaptation and training that allow people to re-tool and re-orient their skills, rather than futile attempts to shrink back the seas that surround any country in today's globalized economic world. We are no more likely to be successful in commanding the sea around us than King Canute was in his proverbial admonition.

The good news, however, is, that doing something positive, without trying to opt out of global togetherness is not as difficult as it is made out to be by those who take human beings as embodiments of inert clay, rather than as enterprising creatures who can learn, develop and think. Keeping the overall level of unemployment low in the economy has to be a major priority no matter how global trade affects domestic economies.

But in the short run a more immediate remedy would require
having an adequate system of social safety nets, that provide social support to guarantee minimal incomes and continued entitlement of all people to essential services, including health care and children's schooling. These may be important even in the longer runner in the special cases of those who cannot adapt, because of age or some particular handicap. What is not, in general, a helpful way of dealing with this problem is to ban economic change, and obstruct technical innovation and product modernization. That imagined remedy only creates problems for the long run and acts, with very few exceptions, as a barrier to economic progress and prosperity.

The more widespread problem, however, is not the likelihood of actual increase in poverty of many people, but the much more common possibility that the fruits of globalization may be very unequally shared by the poorer people in the world - in the rich countries as well as poor ones. Globalization can - and often does - bring some benefit for all, but some people may get a great deal of the benefits while others get awfully little, may be next to nothing. This is not an issue of radical simplicity that the debaters on both sides like to concentrate on in the form of the "poor getting poorer while the rich get richer": the protesters may assert this while the complacent deny it. There have indeed been some cases in which the poor have actually got poorer, but the more pervasive problem is that the poor can, often enough, fail to get an acceptable share of the overall gains from technical progress and economic advancement
that can be generated by global cooperation. Even if the poor were to get just a little richer, this need not imply that the poor are getting a fair share of the benefits of economic interrelations and of the vast potentials of globalization. To demand speedy removal of the appalling poverty and the staggering inequalities that characterize the contemporary world, or to protest against unfair sharing of benefits of global cooperation, it is not necessary to show that those huge inequalities and poverties are also getting marginally larger - they are entirely intolerable anyway.

Related to this is an economic point already mentioned that there is no such thing as "the market outcome," seen as a unique state of affairs that the market economy would invariably lead to. What the market leads to depends necessarily on a variety of other factors. The use of the market economy is consistent with many different ownership patterns, resource availabilities, social opportunities, rules of operation (such as patent laws, anti-trust regulations, etc.). And depending on these influential conditions, the market economy itself would generate different prices, varying terms of trades, diverse income distributions, and more generally disparate overall outcomes.

While the role of local policies at the level of the nation, or of the community, can be very important, there is global responsibility as well. Regarding global omission, there is an urgent need for a more comprehensive programme of world-wide cooperation in eradicating illiteracy and untreated illnesses, which
exterminate people's capability to help themselves and help others.

For facing this challenge, there is a strong case not only for strengthening the hands of those who are trying to broaden the reach of international policy within the existing institutional structure, but also to consider a broadening of the international institutional architecture set up by the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1940s (when the world was a very different place and global disparities were much more easily tolerated).

Regarding "global commission," there has been much discussion recently of the need to change counterproductive institutional arrangements. These include not only trade restrictions that repress exports from poor countries, but also the patent laws which inhibit the use of life-saving drugs - vital for diseases like AIDS - and to correct the system of rewards and penalties to increase the incentive for drug companies to try to develop non-repeating medicine (such as vaccines) through greater research allocation in these vitally needed fields. A change of the incentive structure would be needed for this, but that is of course economics is supposed to be about.

Before I leave this subject to take on other issues, in particular the role of human right, let me focus briefly on another - and less discussed - global malady that causes intense misery as well as lasting deprivation: the involvement of the world powers in globalized trade in arms. Local wars and military conflicts draw not only on regional tensions, but also on the global trade in arms
and weapons. Oddly enough, the world leaders who express deep frustration at the irresponsibility of anti-globalization protesters, lead the countries that also make the most money in this terrible trade. Over the recent decades, the G-8 countries have been consistently selling much more than 80 per cent of the total supply of arms exported in the entire world. The world establishment is firmly entrenched in this business: the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations (a group of five with a good deal of overlap with G-8) were together responsible also for more than 80 per cent of the world arms export nearly every year. The share of the USA alone has hovered around 50 per cent of the total arms sales in the world. And, furthermore, when I last looked at the breakdown, around two-thirds of the American exports of lethal armament went to developing countries.

The arms are used not only with bloody immediate results, but also with devastating effects on the economy, the polity and the society. Not only does the world establishment have an important contributory role in the continuation of this terrible state, but even in the genesis of political militarism in Africa, these powers played a big part when the cold war was fought out over that unhappy continent. During the cold-war-decades, when military overlords - Mobuto or Savimbi or whoever - busted social and political arrangements (and ultimately economic order too) in Africa, they could rely on support either from the USA (and its allies) or from the Soviet Union, depending on their military alliances. The world
powers bear an awesome responsibility in the subversion of democracy in Africa with all its far-reaching consequences, and furthermore have a continuing role in escalating military conflicts today - in Africa and elsewhere - through the fomentation that comes indirectly from the pushing of arms sales. The U.S. refusal to agree to a joint crackdown even on illicit sales of small arms (as proposed some years ago by Kofi Annan, then the Secretary General of the United Nations) illustrates the working of the global extension of what President Eisenhower called "the military-industrial complex" and its hold on the different capitals of the world, including Washington, D.C.

The diverse inequities of contemporary world order demand urgent attention. Both global omissions and global commissions have to be addressed. And the right time to begin is right now.

How do we go about doing this? We have to examine the role of ethics and politics in reforming the world, and the place that can be given in this enterprise to the idea of human rights. The dual presence of opulence and agony in the world that we inhabit makes it hard to avoid fundamental questions about the ethical acceptability of the prevailing arrangements and about our own values and their relevance and reach. And at the same time, these very inequalities make it difficult to change the social arrangements in the necessary way, since the underdogs in society do not enjoy the same kind of power that the people in charge do. This is exactly where Martin
Luther King's ideas and actions are critically important.

In this second part of the lecture I shall try to take up three
distinct questions, which relate to the issues discussed in the
first part about ending poverty, but which also link with the other
themes of this conference, namely human rights and global
solidarity. The first question is: what exactly are human rights?
Despite the huge public appeal of the idea of human rights, many
intellectual critics have no use for it, and indeed find the idea
confused. There is still much support for the view first expressed
by Jeremy Bentham in 1792, in response to the advocacy of human
right in revolutionary France, that "natural rights" are "simple
nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights (an American phrase),
rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts." That line of
dismissal remains very alive today, and despite persistent use of
the idea of human rights in popular discussion and public agitation,
there are many high-brow commentators who see the idea of human
rights as no more than "bawling upon paper" - to use another of
Bentham's barbed portrayal of the French declaration of the "rights
of man." How can there be such a thing as a right that exists even
in the absence of legislation? We have to address this question not
only because Dr. King made powerful use of the idea of human rights,
but also because it is really a central issue in bringing about
radical reforms in the in the unequal world in which we live.

The second question relates to the use of human rights. If
human right is indeed a legitimate idea, how does it actually work,
and how can it be useful for the elimination of global poverty?

The third question concerns the domain of application. To whom do the human rights apply as a relevant political force? How does that political question relate to the morality of ethics and its linkage with political actions and inactions?

4

Jeremy Bentham's objection to natural rights in general and to the so-called "rights of man" in particular (as the revolutionary French called it - what we would today call human rights) arose from his insistence that to make any sense a right must have backing from state support, including punitive treatment of violation. This made Bentham see rights simply as legal rights. As he put it: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from "law of nature" [can come only] "imaginary rights."iv

It is easy to see that Bentham's rejection of the idea of natural "rights of man" depends substantially on the rhetoric of privileged use of the term of "rights," seeing it in its specifically legal interpretation. However, insofar as human rights are taken to be significant ethical claims (as Tom Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft conceptualized them, as did Martin Luther King), the pointer to the fact that these moral claims do not necessarily have legal or institutional force - at least not yet - is obvious enough, but altogether irrelevant.

The correct comparison is, surely, between: (1) a utility-based
ethics (championed by Bentham himself), which sees fundamental ethical importance in utilities but none in any foundational grounds for help that people have for each other, and (2) an ethics that makes room for the significance of human rights (as the advocates of "rights of man" did), linked with the basic importance of human freedoms. Just as utilitarian ethical reasoning takes the form of insisting that the utilities of the relevant persons must be taken into account in deciding on what should be done, the human rights approach demands that the importance of the freedoms that are incorporated in the form of human rights must be given ethical recognition, with all its social as well as legal implications. Indeed, even as Bentham was busy writing down his dismissal of "rights of man" in 1791-92, the reach and range of ethical interpretations of rights were being powerfully explored in such writings as Thomas Paine's Rights of Man, and Mary Wollstonecraft's The Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (though I know of no evidence that Bentham read any of these books).”

5

I turn now to the second question: how can the idea of human rights be useful? There can, in fact, be little doubt that the idea of moral rights can serve - and has often served in practice - as the basis of new legislation. It has frequently been utilized in this way, and this is indeed an important use of human rights. That, for example, is precisely the way the diagnosis of inalienable rights was invoked in the American Declaration of Independence and
reflected in the subsequent U.S. legislation (including the Amendments), a route that has been well-trodden in the legislative history of many countries in the world, for example in the use of that perspective in so-called "human rights" legislations in contemporary Europe. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, promulgated sixty years ago under the intellectual leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, encouraged all countries to undertake such legislation.

In a rightly celebrated essay "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Herbert Hart has argued that people "speak of their moral rights mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system." He added that the concept of a right "belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to determine when one person's freedom may be limited by another's and so to determine what actions may appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules." vi Whereas Bentham saw rights as a "child of law," Hart's view takes the form, in effect, of seeing some natural rights as parents of law: they motivate and inspire specific legislations. Indeed, providing motivation for legislation is certainly one way in which the ethical force of human rights has been constructively deployed.

But is this the only use of the idea of human rights? To acknowledge that human rights can inspire humane legislation is not the same thing as taking the relevance of human rights to lie exclusively in determining what should (in Hart's language)
"appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules." It is important to see that the idea of human rights can be - and is - actually used in several other ways as well. Indeed, if human rights are seen as powerful moral claims - indeed as "moral rights" (to use Hart's phrase) - then surely we have reason for some catholicity in considering different avenues for promoting these claims. The ways and means of advancing the ethics of human rights need not, thus, be confined only to making new laws. For example, monitoring the conduct of the powerful (including governments of countries) and other activist support provided by such organizations as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International or ACLU or OXFAM or Medicines Sans Frontiers, can themselves help to advance the effective reach of acknowledged human rights. In many contexts, legislation may not, in fact, be at all involved.

The connection with legislation is important, both because human rights may inspire fresh legislation and also because the implementation of such legislation may be helped by public participation in the use of the laws involved. The point is not so much whether the legislative route can make the social ethics of human rights more effective. It certainly can do this in many cases. The point, rather, is that there are other routes as well, which too help to make the ethics of human rights more influential and effective.

It is that comprehensive approach towards which Martin Luther King pointed when he used the language of rights and freedoms to
demand what people can cogently demand from society. In his famous speech "I have a dream" given by King, standing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial on the Easter Sunday of 1939, he put the point in this way:

We have come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice....Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of God's children.\textsuperscript{vii}

In his last speech in 1968 "I've been to the Mountaintop," given in Memphis the day before he was killed, Martin Luther King expressed what had brought him to Memphis in support of the badly treated sanitary workers of the city who were on strike:

Now we're going to march again, and we've got to march again, in order to put the issue where it is supposed to be and force everybody to see that there are thirteen hundred of God's children here suffering, sometimes going hungry, going through dark and dreary nights wondering how this thing is going to come out. That's the issue. And we've got to say to the nation, we know how it's coming out. For when people get caught up with that which is right and they are willing to sacrifice for it, there is no stopping point short of victory.\textsuperscript{viii}
The activism of human rights may call for new legislation, but its range and reach are not confined to the legal route only. First and foremost is the acknowledgement to do something urgently—what King called "the fierce urgency of now." The choice of ways and means of effective implementation remains a further issue, in which engagement, whether through legislation or through media exposure or through naming and shaming, can follow the recognition of the urgency of human rights. There are huge lessons in this in the battle to end world poverty.

6

I come finally to the third question, which also gives me an opportunity to raise a somewhat heretical question. To whom do the human rights apply? The obvious answer has to be all the people of the world, irrespective of nationality, location, race, gender, caste, or class, since human rights must be rights of all human beings. The focus of King's early work was much more confined to America than his later articulations. Here, like Mohandas Gandhi whom King admired so much, King operated at two different levels. Even when the immediate activities were confined within a country (India for Gandhi, America for King), the argument used had a clearly universal reach.

The point comes out very clearly, among other places, in King's acknowledgement of the way Gandhi's ideas had helped him to remain committed to non-violence as an effective political instrument for the underdogs of any society.
Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale....It was in this Gandhian emphasis on love and nonviolence that I discovered the method for social reform that I have been seeking. The intellectual and moral satisfaction that I failed to gain from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, the revolutionary methods of Marx and Lenin, the social contracts theory of Hobbes, the "back to nature" optimism of Rousseau, the superman philosophy of Nietzsche, I found in the nonviolent resistance philosophy of Gandhi.\textsuperscript{ix}

The somewhat heretical question that I want to ask is this. Gandhi's arguments and those of King constantly invoke God and see people as "God's children," and yet the argument is meant to apply - and indeed does - to all, irrespective of religious beliefs, including those who, like me, do not have any religious beliefs at all. How does it work? I am no King scholar, nor a Gandhi scholar, despite my hugely engaged reading of both, but I would venture the hypothesis that even though God is constantly invoked, the nature of the detailed argument does not really rest on the connection with God. Even when Reverend King invokes the need to understand the predicament of "thirteen hundred of God's children" in the form of sanitary workers in Memphis, the argument would appeal even to those who do not acknowledge that Godly connection but see human beings as deserving of respect and concern for other - more secular - reasons.
As a non-religious person, I am going now to tread on very
dangerous grounds. I want to understand the nature of the argument
used by Jesus in the story of the Good Samaritan to which King often
referred. He pointed to different aspects of that rich story, but I
want to try out another one. It concerns the domain of our concern,
and raises a question about the interpretation of words such as
"neighbours." In the Book of Common Prayer we are indeed told, in
answer to the question, "What dost though chiefly learn from these
Commandments?": "I learn two things: my duty towards God, and my
duty to my Neighbour." The question is who is one's neighbour? The
interesting thing, to me, is that in explaining that issue, Jesus
himself uses what would appear to be secular reasoning in the story

Jesus is arguing here with a lawyer and his limited conception
of duty to one's neighbours. Jesus tells the lawyer the story of
the wounded man lying on one side of the street who was helped
eventually by the good Samaritan - an event that was preceded by the
refusal of a priest and a Levite to do anything for him. Indeed,
instead of helping, they just crossed the street and walked on the
other side of the road. Jesus does not immediately discuss our duty
to help others - neighbours or not - but rather raises a question
regarding the definition of one's neighbour. He asks the lawyer
with whom he is arguing: "Who was the wounded man's neighbour?" The
lawyer cannot avoid answering, "the man who helped him." And that
was, of course, Jesus's point exactly. The story has to be
understood taking into account the fact that Samaritans were seen as
distant people, who were not at all popular among the Israelites.
To count a Samaritan as a "neighbour" is a huge step for an
Israelite at that time.

When recollecting this story from the Gospels and its
remarkable reach and effectiveness, I am reminded of what Ludwig
Wittgenstein said about the Gospels, in contrast with the more
formidable Epistles of St. Paul: "In the Gospels - as it seems to me
- everything is less pretentious, humbler, simpler. There you find
huts; in Paul a church. There all men are equal and God himself is
a man; in Paul there is already something of a hierarchy; honours
and official positions." Gandhi's and King's invoking of God in
arguments of this type has a similarly broad reach.

The Samaritan is linked to the wounded Israelite through the
former's action in helping the latter. It does not matter whether
the Samaritan was moved by charity, or by what is increasingly
called "minimal humanitarianism," or by a "sense of justice," or by
some deeper 'sense of fairness in treating others as equals." Once
he has done what he felt he should, he has created a new
neighbourhood.

The "neighbourhood" that is constructed by our relations with
distant people is something that has pervasive relevance to the
understanding of justice in general, particularly so in the
contemporary world. We are linked with each other through trade,
commerce, literature, language, music, arts, entertainment,
religion, medicine, health care, politics, media communication, and other ties. Nearly a quarter of a millennium ago, while commenting on the importance of increased contact in expanding the reach of our sense of justice at the very beginning of the industrial revolution and the emergence of contemporary global relationships, David Hume noted:

....again suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions.\textsuperscript{xi}

It is "the largeness of men's views" on which the inclusiveness of ethical concerns draws. And it is the growing "force of their mutual connexions" that make "the boundaries of justice still grow larger." We are increasingly linked also by inexplicitly shared but far-reaching involvement with aversion to inhumanity, and - one hopes - with further discussion of the kind in which Martin Luther King excelled, about global poverty. Even our shared frustrations and shared thoughts on global helplessness can unite rather than divide. These broader global concerns sometimes find organized outlets in demonstrations and protests (rowdy enough to be noticed, sometimes even by the carabiniere), and at other times seek quieter expression in political commentary, media articulation, or just in
personal conversations. In the pointer to the reach of our
corrections, in the arguments presented, in very different ways, by
Jesus and Hume, the narrow idea of neighbourhood is inescapably
expanded across the boundaries.

I end on that note. No theory of human rights can ignore this
broad understanding, related to the pervasive nature of human
presence and nearness, through work and cooperation, through trade
and commerce, through science and literature, through the arts and
music, and through sympathy and commitment. This has to be a
central engagement in theory of justice (on which I shall be giving
three lectures here at Stanford in this coming week). But more
immediately for this conference, the limits of solidarity cannot but
be global. The challenge of poverty across the world is a global
challenge that has demands on everyone's attention, irrespective of
nationality and location, and also irrespective of, I have just
tried to argue, religious beliefs and specific denominational
creeds.

We cannot ultimately fail to take into account our pervasive
neighbourhood in the world today, even if we are inclined, at least
initially, to be persuaded that it is only to our local neighbours
that we owe something. There is a huge need for recognising with
adequate clarity that there are few non-neighbours left in the world
today. There exist, of course, other popular stories focused on
confined neighbourhoods, which go against this recognition, like
that account in the Gospel of Luke presented by the lawyer with whom
Jesus was arguing, but they are much smaller and less compelling
tales than the grand narrative of which we have to take note. I end
by saying how privileged I feel in having the opportunity to speak
in this wonderful conference. I thank you all.
NOTES


vii. A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 82.

viii. A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 211.

